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Lesson of Darkness: Phenomenology and Lyotard’s Late Aesthetics 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship of Jean-François Lyotard’s aesthetics to 
phenomenology, especially the works of Mikel Dufrenne and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
It argues that this comparison allows a greater understanding of Lyotard’s late aesthetic 
writings, which can appear gnomic and which have received relatively little critical 
attention. Lyotard credits Merleau-Ponty with opening the theme of difference in the 
aesthetic field, yet believes that the phenomenological approach can never adequately 
account for it. After outlining Lyotard’s early critiques of Dufrenne and Merleau-
Ponty, the paper will demonstrate how his late aesthetics can be understood as 
returning to phenomenological themes but in the form of a reversal. Lyotard’s “lesson 
of darkness” is that the secret power of art can never be brought into the light of 
phenomenal appearance, and that artworks do not testify to the birth of perception, but 
to its death and resurrection.  
Keywords: phenomenology, aesthetics, Jean-François Lyotard, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Mikel Dufrenne 
Word count: 8, 100 
Jean-François Lyotard, famous for “the postmodern,” is typically not associated with 
phenomenology in the popular imagination. Yet Lyotard’s philosophical roots were 
firmly planted in the phenomenological tradition, out of which his own original 
philosophical work grew. In his student days at the Lycée Louis Le Grand and the 
Sorbonne he studied Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, 1  and his first book was an 
introductory text simply titled Phenomenology. At one time he considered himself a 
follower of Merleau-Ponty,2 and his Doctorat d’Etat was supervised by the leading 
phenomenological aesthetician, Mikel Dufrenne. While his later philosophical 
peregrinations took him far afield of phenomenology, throughout his career Lyotard 
continued to return in particular to Merleau-Ponty, and one of his last essays is a 
discussion of the phenomenologist’s notion of the flesh.3 
1 Kiff Bamford, Jean-François Lyotard, 25. 
2 Jean-François Lyotard, Peregrinations, 11. 
3 Lyotard, ‘Formule charnelle’ in Misère de la philosophie. 
1
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology on 9 September 2018, available online: http://
www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00071773.2018.151865910.1080/00071773.2018.1518659
  
I will argue here that Lyotard’s approach to aesthetics can be understood as both an 
extension and a radical critical overturning of phenomenological aesthetics, such that 
we might characterise his aesthetics as “postphenomenological.” (I don’t intend this 
term in the sense in which it is associated with Don Idhe and North American 
developments in phenomenology, but rather use it to invoke the critical but 
constructive continuity we are used to hearing in the term “poststructuralist.”)  
In particular, what the analysis I propose here hopes to achieve is to increase 
understanding of Lyotard’s late aesthetics (his writings on art in the 1990s), which 
have as yet received little attention in the secondary literature.4 My strategy here will 
be to introduce problems by recounting Lyotard’s early critical engagements with 
phenomenology, but then to by-pass his earlier answers in terms of radical 
psychoanalytic theory and Kantian aesthetics, and to pass straight to his late period, 
which we may see as responding to these very problems. We will see how his late 
aesthetics return to the ambit of phenomenological themes and echo phenomenological 
language, but constitute a reversal of the phenomenological approach.  
 
What Lyotard consistently identified as being at stake in the arts – something 
“unpresentable” – takes its bearings at least in part from Merleau-Ponty’s theme of the 
invisible – that which, in the visible, does not appear as visible. At the beginning of his 
first major book, Lyotard credits Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with opening the 
problematic he is interested in, that of difference in the perceptual and aesthetic fields.5 
For Merleau-Ponty this difference is primarily that of the dimensions of perception 
which are its essential conditions for appearing but do not appear as such, being                                                         
4  The two main books in English so far dedicated to Lyotard’s philosophy of art, Kiff 
Bamford’s Lyotard and the ‘figural’ in Performance, Art, and Writing and Graham Jones’ 
Lyotard Reframed, for all their many merits, both lack any discussion of Lyoatrd’s writings on 
art in the nineteen-nineties. A few articles and book chapters are exceptions, yet they focus on 
specific aspects of Lyotard’s late aesthetics rather than attempting a general characterization, 
which is my task here. See for example Andrew Benjamin, ‘Colouring Philosophy’;  Kas 
Saghafi, ‘Lyotard’s Gesture’ and Kiff Bamford, ‘No Place for Complacency: The Resistance 
of Gesture,’ both in Gailard et. al. (eds.) Traversals of Affect; and Jean-François Nordmann, 
‘Anamnèse et creation : les deux voies finales de sortie de l’esthétique chez Jean-François 
Lyotard’ in Coblence and Michel Enaudeau (eds.). Lyotard et les arts. I have bracketed 
Lyotard’s works on Malraux in the nineteen-nineties, which have garnered further critical 
attention, because although some of the themes are resonant, they are developed in terms 
(Malraux’s own) quite different to the phenomenological ones I am drawing out here. 
5 See Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 16. 
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 eclipsed by what appears – dimensions such as depth, distance, and the hidden 
“underside” of things. The theory of perception needs to move away from the identity 
of the phenomenal thing which appears, towards the difference which is its condition.6 
It is this dimension of difference which points Merleau-Ponty to the invisible, and 
which he explores within a primarily phenomenological framework. For Lyotard, 
however, the “unpresentable” may be approached via phenomenology, but not 
elaborated by it.7 
 
In his 1954 book Phenomenology, Lyotard notes how phenomenology contains its own 
contradiction and self-transcendence within it. He writes: “‘the phenomenality of the 
phenomena is never itself a phenomenal datum,’ as Eugen Fink rightly notes.”8 And, 
furthermore: “Is there not, in sum, a phenomenological decision to assume a viewpoint 
where ‘the appearing of the being is not itself a thing that appears’?”9 There is, in 
phenomenology from the start (that is, in Husserl’s own work) an inclination not to 
remain content with a description of appearances, but to move beyond to a knowledge 
of the conditions of what appears. This “moving beyond” involves a kind of 
transcendental thinking, and in many phenomenologists, as accentuated with 
Heidegger, seeks to attain knowledge of an ontological or metaphysical order. As we 
shall see, it is on the relation between what appears and what does not appear, and the 
related question of what we can know and what we cannot, that Lyotard takes issue 
with phenomenology. The upshot of his critique is that Lyotard does not believe 
phenomenology is capable of adequately accounting for the dimension of difference he 
thinks essential to the arts. As a defender of the avant-garde and experimental arts, 
Lyotard is primarily concerned with the emergence of the radically new, the way a 
work can strike us as something never before seen or heard. In this sense, he defines 
the work and its aesthetic reception as an event, an unpredictable singular occurrence, 
something of which escapes every attempt to familiarise it. While phenomenology                                                         
6 Merleau-Ponty writes: “We have to pass from the thing (spatial or temporal) as identity, to 
the thing (spatial or temporal) as difference, i.e. as transcendence, i.e. as always “behind,” 
beyond, far-off …” The Visible and the Invisible, 195. In fact for Merleau-Ponty a very 
important part of the invisible is what the philosophical tradition calls the intelligible – the 
dimension of concepts, meaning, or sense – yet, for reasons which will become clear, Lyotard 
does not seek to elaborate this dimension of the invisible, but rather seeks a deeper underside 
to the sensible. 
7 Lyotard, ‘God and the Puppet’ in The Inhuman, 160. 
8 Lyotard, Phenomenology, 134. 
9 Ibid. 
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 opens the theme of difference, which leads the way to thinking such an event, it 
forestalls this attempt by ultimately inscribing everything within a homogenising 
epistemological and metaphysical horizon. This is what leads Lyotard to depart from 
phenomenology, believing that the concerns and problems it evokes – to which he 
arguably remains faithful – cannot ultimately be done justice while remaining within a 
phenomenological perspective. It is precisely such concerns, we will see, which lead 
him to reverse phenomenology when he returns to echo its language and themes in his 
late aesthetics. 
 
Let us begin to explore these issues through Lyotard’s first critical encounters with 
phenomenology in the works of Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty. It is Merleau-Ponty, and 
not Dufrenne, to whose works Lyotard would never cease to return, to test his 
developments in aesthetics against the touchstone of the great phenomenologist. Yet I 
will begin with Dufrenne because the same core issues on which Lyotard critiques 
Merleau-Ponty are also present in the former, and appear there in sharper relief: whilst 
not lacking in profundity, Dufrenne’s works are not suffused in the same atmosphere 
of ambiguity as are Merleau-Ponty’s, in both form and content. In the case of both 
phenomenologists, Lyotard critiques what he calls a “metaphysics of continuity.”  
 
 
Nature speaks  
 
Lyotard’s explicit references to Dufrenne are few, and consist only of some brief but 
dense pages in Discourse, Figure and a long review of Dufrenne’s book Pour 
L’homme from the same period.10 In both he develops a critique of Dufrenne’s thesis 
that “Nature speaks,” a thesis we may approach through some key points in the 
development of Dufrenne’s project. Edward S. Casey, Dufrenne’s primary English 
translator, has astutely noted that in The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, 
Dufrenne outlines not only the structure of that book, but of his entire philosophical 
trajectory, when he writes: “We shall pass from the phenomenological to the 
                                                        
10 Lyotard, ‘A la place de l’homme, l’expression.’ A text by Lyotard published in a special 
journal issue dedicated to Dufrenne in 1996, under the title ‘Language et nature,’ is a slightly 
modified excerpt from the earlier article. 
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 transcendental, and the transcendental will itself flow into the metaphysical.”11 For him 
this means beginning with a phenomenological description of aesthetic experience, 
then moving to the transcendental in asking how aesthetic experience is possible, and 
then to the metaphysical in seeking an ontological grounding for this possibility. 
 
For Dufrenne, aesthetic experience is the result of an “agreement” between the 
objective and subjective sides of such experience: the artwork and the one who 
appreciates it. How is this agreement possible? He argues for what he calls “affective a 
priori,” which are conditions common to the feeling subject and felt object which he 
believes are necessary for their unity in aesthetic experience. The subject, that is, must 
possess the same “affective a priori” in order to recognise and feel the affect the 
aesthetic object expresses. These affective a priori are the commonly known aesthetic 
categories such as the tragic, the comic, the sublime, the beautiful, and so on (though 
Dufrenne does not think we can draw up an exhaustive list of such categories; for him 
the a priori are only revealed a posteriori, and new artworks can bring to light new 
affective qualities).  
 
The unity of subject and object in aesthetic feeling reveals a deeper unity of the human 
and the world, which leads Dufrenne to a more global and extensive consideration of 
the transcendental, which might account for this unity, in his book The Notion of the A 
Priori. Here he develops the idea that every a priori has both an ontic and a 
transcendental character. He explains this double aspect as follows: 
 
It is transcendental so far as it is a virtual knowledge of the object, previous to and 
orienting experience, and ontic so far as it is a structure of the object. In this way 
the mind is at home [se retrouve] in the world without constituting it, and 
conversely the world is equally at home in the mind, without producing it.12 
 
It is as if the human and the world were made for each other. This accord between the 
human and the world is thus a generalisation of the accord between a subjective and an 
objective a priori which Dufrenne drew from his analysis of aesthetic experience. 
Dufrenne then argues that in order for this accord to be possible, we have to assume an                                                         
11 Mikel Dufrenne, Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, lxvi. Casey makes this point in his 
introductions to both Dufrenne’s Phenomenology and The Notion of the A Priori. 
12 Dufrenne, The Notion of the A Priori, 218. 
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 “a priori of the a priori,” a deep ground for the commonality of subjective virtual 
knowledge and objective structure. While Dufrenne notes that this ground is what 
Heidegger calls Being and Merleau-Ponty calls flesh, he prefers to call it Nature, in 
Spinoza’s sense of natura naturans, nature as productive power or process. This is 
effectively the proposition of a monism prior to the dualism of subject and object 
which make the latter possible and from which they emerge.  
 
However, a philosophical elaboration of Nature presents itself as a problem for 
Dufrenne. At the end of The Notion of the A Priori, he argues that philosophy, which 
proceeds by way of rational discourse, cannot furnish us with a knowledge of this 
unitary ground. In fact, according to him this dark ground “is something of which there 
is nothing to be known, because a consciousness that was one with the world would be 
a consciousness totally lost in the world. It would be as blind and as mute as a stone.”13 
Knowledge is only possible when the unity of Nature is separated into the duality of 
the human and the world, the subject and the object. In Lyotard’s formulation, 
according to Dufrenne the human is “chiasmed nature,”14 that place where Nature 
separates itself from itself in order to know itself, to relate its two parts through a 
communication based on an affinity.  
 
This problem is one which Lyotard had already, in his 1954 book, placed at the heart 
of phenomenology: how to express, in language, the truth of phenomena prior to 
language? (Or in Lyotard’s assessment, “the phenomenological enterprise is 
fundamentally contradictory as designation in language of a prelogical signified in 
being.” 15 ) For Dufrenne, Nature is precisely this “prelogical signified in being,” 
something not amenable to rational or linguistic articulation because it precedes the 
separation of subject and object which allow being to appear to itself and to be known. 
In his words: 
 
[H]ow can one think of a Nature that would be a world without man, before man, 
and consequently a world before the world, from which would proceed the world 
                                                        
13 Dufrenne, Language and Philosophy, 97. 
14 See the section ‘L’homme comme nature chiasmée’ in Lyotard, ‘A la place.’ 
15 Lyotard, Phenomenology, 68-9. 
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 and man, but which would have to be conceived first without reference to the 
world and to man? How can one think with no thought there to think?16 
 
Invoking metaphors of light and darkness, day and night, which we will see resonate 
later, he elaborates the problem and broaches a solution as follows: 
 
What is there to say of Nature, of that Grund of which the very idea forbids all 
discourse, of that Night that not even the natural light of a gaze lights up, and that 
no language can name in order to contrast it with Day? To have a presentiment of 
it, it may be necessary to put oneself in the moment when speech is silent or the 
gaze extinct, at the hour of death. We have to die to the world for the reign of raw 
being to come again, for Nature to be restored to itself; and that is why every 
authentic word is haunted by death and every work of art contains a core 
illegibility. There a muted murmuring is heard, the tireless murmur of “there is,” 
the inarticulate voice of the desert. The work of art speaks only to be given over to 
that silence.17  
 
For Dufrenne, we can have something like a pre-subjective “experience” of Nature, 
and it can to some degree be articulated through us, because Nature expresses itself 
through the human. Or, as Lyotard sums up this thesis, according to Dufrenne “Nature 
speaks.”18 For him, the poetic is what allows us some understanding of Nature: the 
poetic is “expression,” the primitive form of meaning part way between the mute 
meaning of Nature and the articulate language of propositional speech and writing. The 
poetic is a kind of primordial meaning which cannot be reduced to written or spoken 
poetry as such, although the later nevertheless serves as a privileged example. Poetry 
can serve this function because, rather than separate subject and object through the 
distancing effects of representation or designation (indicating from within language an 
object which exists outside of it), it makes language itself take on something of the 
affective quality of that of which it speaks, partially eliding the difference between 
subject and object. In Dufrenne’s words: “In poetry, words are like things, palpable 
                                                        
16 Dufrenne, ‘The A Priori and the Philosophy of Nature’ in In the Presence of the Sensuous, 
16-17. 
17 Dufrenne, ‘The A Priori and the Philosophy of Nature’ in In the Presence, 18. 
18 See the section ‘Language et nature’ in Lyotard, ‘A la place.’  
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 and tasty as a fruit.”19 He extends this metaphor of the fruit to suggest that the term 
“expression” in the discussion of poetry should be understood in the same sense that 
we imagine the juice of an orange being expressed when it is squeezed: in poetry, the 
things themselves express themselves.20 Poetry, then, brings us close to the language 
which Nature itself already in some sense speaks. Dufrenne writes that Nature   
 
carries within it, at the heart of its inconceivable unity, the principle of openness, 
the germ of the mediation by which it will yield to daylight and to language. It is 
already articulating itself, preparing to be spoken.21 
 
While the example of poetry may illuminate much about the poetic, the latter has a 
broader scope, and is a privileged a priori which indicates the link between the human 
being and the world, and the possibility of expression. The poetic is thus a state of the 
world as well as a state of the human. It is a state of feeling rather than thought. All art, 
according to Dufrenne, can attain the poetic in this sense, and thus the claims about 
poetry can be generalised to the claim that art is nature speaking, expressing itself.22 If 
poetry remains a privileged example, however, it is because it indicates the continuity 
between feeling, perception, and linguistic modes of expression: it shows how despite 
their differences, there is no absolute foreclosure of access between the dark ground of 
Nature and articulate philosophical discourse because the expression of feeling acts as 
a mediator between them. (While visual or sonic art too are just as powerful and 
important forms of expression, they do not indicate the continuity with language that 
poetry does.) 
 
Let us move now to Lyotard’s critical reception of Dufrenne. Lyotard characterises 
Dufrenne’s philosophy as a “metaphysics of continuity,” referring to the continuity 
between the mute meaning with which Nature is pregnant and the meanings which 
human knowledge articulates; a continuity, we have just seen, which is given by the 
poetic as the “expression” which lies in between. Lyotard argues against such a 
continuity, and invokes two orders of “facts” which he believes testify to the separation                                                         
19 Dufrenne, ‘The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry,’ 16. 20 Dufrenne, ‘The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry,’ 17. 21 Dufrenne, ‘The A Priori and the Philosophy of Nature’ in In the Presence, 20. 
22 Dufrenne writes: “all art is poetic, as soon as it ceases to be merely sensual or didactic and as 
soon as feeling ceases to have a definable object.” The Notion of the A Priori, 237. 
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 of nature and language.23 First, he argues that psychoanalysis (to which he complains 
Dufrenne has not done justice) shows that rather than a continuity between nature and 
language, there is a function of repression. Nature (which would be understood from 
the psychoanalytic point of view as desire which arises in the body) does not achieve 
expression in consciousness and language without censorship, deception and distortion. 
Thus rather than giving us access to a primordial experience of meaning, consciousness 
and language are subject to mechanisms which hide and cause us to misrecognise our 
deepest desires. As a counterpoint to Dufrenne’s occasional evocations of a kind of 
primal unity expressed by myths of Nature, Lyotard claims that “[a]ll myths speak of 
an order conquered with difficulty on ‘disorder,’ which is desire.”24 Second, Lyotard 
asserts that language can’t absorb the sensible, only indicate it by the function of 
designation, which points beyond the order of linguistic meaning to what, in the 
sensible world, it speaks about. This point is most pithily summed up in Discourse, 
Figure where he writes that “[o]ne can say that the tree is green, but saying so does not 
put colour in the sentence.”25 In short, Lyotard is deeply sceptical of Dufrenne’s thesis 
that “Nature speaks,” a thesis grounded in a metaphysics of continuity, and to the 
contrary insists on a discontinuity between Nature and meaning, between the sensible 
and language, and between the aesthetic event and knowledge. 
 
Lyotard’s disagreements with Dufrenne here do not just concern the abstractions of 
metaphysics or the philosophy of language; they have direct aesthetic, and also 
political, import, as we see in Lyotard’s further arguments concerning the nature of 
poetry. First, Lyotard objects to Dufrenne’s view of poetry by noting that “[i]f it were 
true that nature speaks, poetry would be the natural state for us, and it would not be 
poetry.” 26  That is, Dufrenne’s view makes us wonder why there is a distinction 
between ordinary language and poetic expression, which, as Lyotard will emphasise, 
seems to be precisely an extraordinary, artificial state of language. Lyotard then 
outlines this alternative view of the poetic function as follows. While he agrees that 
poetry is nonreferential language, he denies that it is the primordial language, in which 
Nature expresses itself. Rather, he sees it as a “second denaturation”: the first                                                         
23 Lyotard, ‘A la place,’ 173.  
24 Ibid. All translations from French texts cited are mine. 25 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 50. 
26 Lyotard, ‘A la place,’ 176. 
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 denaturation is articulate, signifying language, which emerges from a break with and 
repression of nature. The poetic is then the result of critical, deconstructive work on 
signifying language, which transgresses its syntactic and semantic rules. Lyotard writes 
that these transgressions are “operations which partially undo language, which dig into 
it in order to make images erupt from the substance itself.” 27  Understood as 
deconstructive work on signifying language, “poetry shows precisely that there is no 
continuity between nature and language, that the latter was won at the cost of the 
repression of the former.”28 
 
For Lyotard, moreover, these views about poetry are not politically innocent. Dufrenne 
himself suggests that poetry can have a political vocation insofar as the return to nature 
as origin it affords reveals the arbitrary, and changeable, character of culture.29 Yet for 
Lyotard Dufrenne’s approach implies a relatively conservative position which limits 
poetry’s critical capacity and political effectiveness. Lyotard explains that “this is a 
crucial point: the thesis of connaturality of poetry and the world inevitably rests on a 
certain poetic idea that privileges its power of reconciliation while ignoring its critical 
power of reversal.”30 Lyotard points to passages in Dufrenne’s book Le Poétique where 
the author characterises the poetic state as a “soft” and docile one, one he describes as 
“a gentle and discreet flow of the imagination.”31 Taking up Dufrenne’s emphasis on 
the bodily, affective dimension of the poetic, Lyotard raises questions about the nature 
of the body presumed here, questions which we will see repeated below in his 
encounter with Merleau-Ponty: 
 
True, poetry always appeals to the body, but to which one? Exclusively to the 
cradled, caressed, seduced body, possessing or thinking itself in possession of the 
“good object,” convinced of its “good form”? Or also to the body capable of 
letting the “bad object” be, of surrendering to “bad” forms that are no less true than 
the good ones; to the body capable of having an ear for disharmonies, glissandos, 
and clashes, and of hearing meaning in these; of having an eye for dischromatisms, 
“abstractions” of value, and errant traces, and of seeing meaning in these? A body,                                                         
27 Lyotard, ‘A la place,’ 174. 
28 Lyotard, ibid. 
29 Dufrenne, ‘The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry,’ 19. 
30 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 289. 
31 Dufrenne, Le Poétique, 82; quoted in Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 289. 
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 in other words, able to face non-conciliation without softness.32  
 
The political rub of Lyotard’s critique here is that the “soft” poetry of reconciliation, 
which tolerates only harmony and good form, lends itself to a sleepy pleasure which 
contributes to maintaining, rather than critically engaging, prevailing ideologies and 
political structures.  
 
 
Linguistic gesture 
 
Now that we have seen the “metaphysics of continuity” outlined with Dufrenne, we 
may see how this theme manifests and is critiqued by Lyotard with respect to Merleau-
Ponty. It is well-known that Merleau-Ponty sees art as phenomenology done by other 
means, and that it testifies to the birth of perception. The artist performs something like 
the phenomenological reduction, and is able to see the way in which appearance 
appears as such when we closely attend to phenomena at a level deeper than the natural 
attitude. The artist’s ability to capture what we typically don’t see gives us insight into 
the way meaning (sens) arises in primordial perception. In his famous example of 
Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we see the way in which the visual field takes 
form, as patches of colour give rise to suggestions of line and shape.33 
 
The continuity between the philosophical exercise of phenomenology (that is, the 
expression of primordial reality in language and concepts) and its artistic exercise (its 
expression in paint, bronze, etc.) may be understood as grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy by his gestural theory of meaning. This theory posits the gesture – that is, a 
meaningful bodily movement or comportment – as the basic model of all meaning, 
including linguistic meaning. Merleau-Ponty argues that the most fundamental form of 
meaning develops in the operative intentionality of the body in its relation to the world, 
prior to the level of the intentionality of acts, conceptual thought, or linguistic 
expression. The way that the body makes sense of the world, and communicates this 
sense to other bodies, is gestural. Yet Merleau-Ponty also argues that linguistic 
expression is fundamentally gestural, suggesting that language signifies “the meaning 
                                                        
32 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 290. 
33 See Merleau-Ponty, ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader. 
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 of thought as a footprint signifies the movement and effort of a body.”34 The gesture 
does not represent anything, but is itself meaning; its content and form are inseparable: 
what the gesture means is what it is or does as the body engages itself with the world. 
Words do not represent or “clothe” pre-existing ideas, but are themselves the bodies of 
thought which express meaning through their speaking gestures. The gesture thus acts 
as an analogical model for explaining how language is meaningful, but the idea of the 
“linguistic gesture” is more than this – it also indicates that the primal level of meaning 
from which language develops is gestural in the bodily sense, such that there is a 
continuity between bodily expression in the perceptual field and linguistic expression 
in the semantic field, the latter being founded on the former as the condition of its 
possibility.35 
 
Like Dufrenne, Merleau-Ponty points to poetry, understood as the presence of the 
body, the perceptual, and feeling in language, as evidence for the continuity between 
bodily gesture and linguistic gesture.36 In short, the upshot for Merleau-Ponty is that 
both bodily movements and linguistic acts have a common fundamental meaning as 
gestural expression. Sole responsibility for such a gestural meaning, of course, is not 
ascribed to the subject of the philosophical tradition: in The Phenomenology of 
Perception the lived body creates such meaning in dialogue with the world, and 
Merleau-Ponty refers it to an anonymous “One” below the level of the ego, while in his 
last ontology it is a matter of the reversibility and intertwining through which the flesh 
folds, articulates, and communicates with itself. As Lyotard explains: 
 
gesture, as Merleau-Ponty understood it, is the experience of a meaning where the 
felt and feeling come together in a common rhythm—like the two folds of a single 
                                                        
34  Merleau-Ponty, ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’ in The Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader, 82. 
35 See the sections on The understand of gestures and The linguistic gesture in Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, 190-3. 
36  Merleau-Ponty points to the emotional dimension – which is the gestural dimension - 
essential to poetry, and observes: “We would then find that words, vowels, and phonemes are 
so many ways of singing the world, and that they are destined to represent objects, not through 
an objective resemblance, in the manner imagined by the naïve theory of onomatopoeia, but 
because they are extracted from them, and literally express their emotional essence.” The 
Phenomenology of Perception, 193.  
12
 furrow—and where the constituents of the sensory form an organic and diachronic 
totality.37 
 
Merelau-Ponty’s theory of expression then appears to have the same trait of continuity 
as Dufrenne’s: ultimately what is expressed is Being or flesh: the undivided dividing 
itself yet criss-crossing, communicating itself to itself in a chiasmatic upsurge of 
meaning. Merelau-Ponty continued to emphasise terms such as ambiguity, 
reversibility, and the chiasm, which indicate an overlapping without absolute 
coincidence, because such an absolute coincidence would obliterate the gap or spacing 
(écart) which is necessary for Being to appear to itself: it would be the Night of 
Dufrenne’s Nature “in itself.” Lyotard notes that Dufrenne proceeds from duality to 
unity, and Merleau-Ponty from unity to duality38, yet both posit the same metaphysics 
of continuity in either direction: the continuity between a unity which is the ultimate 
source of meaning and the duality necessary to perceive and articulate this meaning. 
For both, expression is the passage of this continuity, through which unity becomes 
duality.  
 
Lyotard argues that the notion of the gesture, while posited in an attempt to overcome 
the subject/object divide, nevertheless points back to a subjectivity which hinders an 
openness to alterity. He writes: 
 
the gesture refers if not to a subject, then at least to a kind of subjectivity, however 
anonymous or “natural,” as Mikel Dufrenne would put it: it is experienced, lived, 
or in any case structures lived life, partaking of an unconscious that is not object of 
repression but subject of constitution.39 
 
Merleau-Ponty invokes the notion of the “One,” in the sense of a nonpersonal subject, 
in order to point to the fact that our lived experience is not constituted by an active ego 
or consciousness, but by the body in its operative relation to the world. The One is 
anonymous and in a sense unconscious because it is posited as being prior to the 
emergence of conscious subjectivity and reflective self-awareness.40 In this, Merleau-                                                        
37 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 15. 
38 Lyotard, ‘Language et nature,’ 48. 
39 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 15. 
40 See for example Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, Part Two, Chapter I, 
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 Ponty pursues the path of passivity opened by Husserl through the notion of passive 
synthesis, and Lyotard notes that Merleau-Ponty takes this path as far as it can go in 
the essay ‘Eye and Mind.’ Yet for Lyotard, this is still not far enough. He contrasts 
Merelau-Ponty’s attempts to locate the unconscious underside of conscious experience 
with that of Freud’s, and again points to the difference between the harmonious 
continuity of meaning the phenomenologist posits and the disruptive order of 
repression posited by the psychoanalyst. What is at stake here is the capacity to locate 
something like the transcendental condition of possibility for the event, the principle of 
radical alterity which would account for the emergence of the truly unexpected and 
disruptive. Lyotard explains: 
 
 The “One” does not constitute an event in relation to the “I,” on the contrary. 
What would this direction of anonymity lead to? At best the organization of the 
forms of sensibility, a space-time admittedly buried deeper than that of lived 
experience and less beholden to the laws of physical knowledge than the one Kant 
described, but notwithstanding a space and time that make up the frame in which 
the given gives itself, in which the event erupts, but which could never be the 
principle of an event. However preconceptual a system, like every system it is 
likely to testify not to the fact that something eventful has taken place (in the 
visual field or elsewhere), but precisely that the event (the bestowal) has been 
absorbed, received, perceived, integrated as world (or as history, etc.).41  
 
Lyotard further argues that while Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “lived body” is an 
attempt to reach this preconscious level, it also has a homogenising effect and cannot 
account for the eruption of the event. Merelau-Ponty’s view of the body is one which is 
attuned to the world in meaning, and through which meaning is made in dialogue with                                                                                                                                                                 
‘Sensing,’ section d. Generality and particularity of the “senses”, where we read: “Every 
perception takes place within an atmosphere of generality and is presented to us as anonymous. 
… if I wanted to express perceptual experience with precision, I would have to say that one 
perceives in me, and not that I perceive. … I experience sensation as a modality of a general 
existence, already destined to a physical world, which flows through me without my being its 
author.” (223-4) This theme persists up to The Visible and the Invisible where we find, among 
other references, the following in the working notes: “I must be there in order to perceive - - 
But in what sense? As one --” (190) and “The I really is nobody, is the anonymous; it must be 
so, prior to all objectification, denomination, in order to be the Operator, or the one to whom 
all this occurs. The named I, the I named (Le Je dénommé, le dénommé Je) is an object. The 
primary I, of which this one is the objectification, is the unknown to whom all is given to see or 
to think, to whom everything appeals, before whom … there is something.” (246) 
41 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 16-17. 
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 the world. For Lyotard there is too much harmony in this body, as there is in the body 
appealed to in Dufrenne’s view of the poetic. He argues that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the body fails to take account of the way the body can be 
disposessed, the way it can loose its grip on the world and fail to make meaning with it, 
as in such common experiences as sleep and orgasm.42 And he faults Merleau-Ponty 
for not doing justice to the radically disconcerting effects of emotion, to the point of 
claiming that there is no emotive body in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception.43 
 
The ultimate significance of Lyotard’s critiques of the metaphysics of continuity 
underlying the phenomenological theories of expression come into focus with his 
reflections on the epistemological privilege characteristic of phenomenology. For it is 
the supposed continuity between primordial reality, perception, art, and language 
which allow the inscription of all these concerns within a horizon of knowledge. Under 
the likely influence of Levinas, Lyotard asserts that “[p]henomenology cannot possibly 
reach the bestowal [of the event] since, faithful to the West’s philosophical tradition, it 
remains a reflection on knowledge, and the purpose of such a reflection is to absorb the 
event, to recuperate the Other into the Same.”44 Typically, and as often seems to be the 
case with Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty, phenomenologists make art and aesthetics a 
stage on the way to knowledge, ultimately the presumptuous knowledge of Being 
itself. This tendency is confirmed and clearly expressed by a somewhat later 
phenomenologist, Michel Henry, who writes in his 1988 book Seeing the Invisible: On 
Kandinsky:   
What the greatest minds have ultimately sought from art is knowledge, a true or 
‘metaphysical’ knowledge, capable of reaching beyond the external appearance 
of phenomena in order to lead us to their intimate essence.45                                                         
42 Lyotard writes: “It would be false to contend that we are always immersed in the world as 
though in a bath of perceptions and meanings. Nor have we said the last word on the subject of 
our spatiotemporal experience by characterizing it as an enwrapped depth, an immanent 
transcendence, a chiasm. The world, too, is open to events: it is prey to slips, to surges of non-
immersive zones, to crises of ‘transcendence’ without counterpart; worldly space and time can 
fail us, just as language can.” Discourse, Figure, 130. 
43 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 424 n.3. 
44 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 17. Daniel Charles has also noted that Levinas comes to mind 
on reading the passage quoted here. ‘Chair et Lyse,’ 64. 
45 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 3. 
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Ultimately this knowledge, as Henry indicates, is the metaphysical or ontological 
knowledge of something which exceeds the phenomena themselves; a knowledge of 
what does not appear. As we have seen, this knowledge is supposedly made possible, 
according to Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty, by the continuity between the human being 
and the world, between Being and meaning, which is also the continuity between 
perception, expression, and signification. This continuity is in turn grounded and 
accounted for by the supposition of an ultimately monistic ontology (Nature or flesh, 
or, in the case of Henry, life). 
 
In returns to Merleau-Ponty in writings after Discourse, Figure, Lyotard demonstrates 
the implications of these critical points regarding the metaphysics of continuity for a 
philosophy of art. Firstly of note is Lyotard’s ultimate scepticism (despite all his 
evident admiration) of Merelau-Ponty’s treatment of Cézanne. In the essay ‘Freud 
According to Cézanne,’ he cites in this context the phenomenological concern with 
knowledge just mentioned. Lyotard writes that Merelau-Ponty’s “analysis remains 
subordinate to a philosophy of perception that allows him to rediscover the true order 
of the sensible in Cézannean disorder, and to lift the veil that Cartesian and Galilean 
rationalism had thrown over the world of experience.”46 To this approach he then 
objects that 
 
[w]e have no reason to believe that the curvature of Cézannean space, its intrinsic 
disequilibrium […] more properly restores to us in person the phenomenality of 
the sensible than were Uccello’s passion for perspective, Leonardo’s for the 
model, or Klee’s for plastic possibility.47 
 
Moreover, Lyotard asserts that what Cézanne was after was not knowledge but the 
event: “Cézanne desires nothing more than to have Mount Sainte-Victoire cease to be 
an object of sight to become an event in the visual field: this is what the 
phenomenologist hopes to understand, and which I believe he cannot.”48 
                                                         46 Lyotard, ‘Freud According to Cézanne,’ 33. 47 Lyotard, ‘Freud According to Cézanne,’ 33-4. 
48 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 16. 
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 The suspicion of Merleau-Ponty’s valorisation of one artist over another on the basis of 
an epistemological or metaphysical criterion – their capacity to reveal “the true order 
of the sensible” – comes more fully to light in Lyotard’s later essay ‘Philosophy and 
Painting in the Age of their Experimentation.’ 49  Here he argues that the 
phenomenological assumption that we can have access to a true knowledge of Being or 
Nature (even if indirect, oblique, or ambiguous) leads us to a distorted perspective on 
art which fails to appreciate the full range of its power. After opining that metaphysics 
is the arrogance of philosophers, Lyotard writes that 
 
Merleau-Ponty, one of the least arrogant of philosophers, still is unable to say 
that the eye’s relation to the visible which is the relation of Being to itself in its 
primordial “enfolding,” finds expression in Cézanne or Giacometti, without 
immediately devalorizing other experimentations, such as Marey’s, the cubists’, 
or Duchamp’s. He does so because they are unaware, he believes, of the 
“paradoxical” arrangement, the dischrony of elements as they relate to the 
whole, which alone, according to Rodin whom the philosopher follows here, 
can restore the being of movement or being as movement. This peculiar 
intolerance causes Merleau-Ponty to misjudge experiments on the perceptible 
and the speaker in works that require the commentator to exert just as strong a 
pressure on language as the pressure exerted by a Cézanne. Such inflexibility in 
the name of Being ...50  
 
In sum, the upshot of Lyotard’s critiques of the phenomenologists Dufrenne and 
Merleau-Ponty is that they are unable to carry their transcendental enquires far enough 
to account for the radical alterity which bestows the event and makes art possible. We 
might say that for Lyotard, phenomenology’s attempt to move beyond the phenomena 
that appear to the conditions of appearing as such is both too ambitious, and not 
ambitious enough. It is too ambitious in proposing, according to the “metaphysics of 
continuity,” that we can have knowledge of the things themselves because the being of 
what doesn’t appear is continuous with what does. Yet it is not ambitious enough 
because it cannot think the radical alterity of aesthetic phenomena, the way that we 
have “access” to things themselves through sensation and feeling, through their sheer                                                         
49 In The Lyotard Reader. 
50 Lyotard, ‘Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Their Experimentation: Contribution to an 
Idea of Postmodernity’ in The Lyotard Reader, 331. 
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 unknowability, but ability to impinge on our faculties in a negative manner. Merleau-
Ponty is unable to think the difference in the aesthetic field he opens us to because his 
reflections always return to a harmonious economy of the Same. 
 
The metaphysics of continuity organises all meaning, including aesthetic meaning, 
according to a kind of teleology, that of the expression of a “natural meaning” towards 
the “good forms” of our habitual experience of the world. If art is limited to the 
supposed expression of Nature, or to the capturing of the process of perception’s 
organisation, then artistic experimentation is drastically limited: all art is a series of 
perspectives on an ultimately unified Being, and there is no room for radical invention, 
the eruption of the genuinely new.  
 
In Discourse, Figure, Lyotard locates the principle of difference which he believes can 
account for the bestowal of the event and the character of avant-garde art in desire.51 
Throughout the late nineteen-sixties and early ‘seventies, he developed this theme of 
desire in radical psychoanalytic terms, through his “figural” and then “libidinal 
economic” aesthetics. In the later ‘seventies and ‘eighties, he abandoned desire in 
favour of linguistic pragmatics and Kantian aesthetics. This trajectory seems to leave 
phenomenology far behind, and I will not pursue it here. Instead, I want to move in the 
next section straight to Lyotard’s last period, where, I will argue, we see the return of 
phenomenological language and themes, but in the form of a reversal. By way of 
transition (and in order to demonstrate that this characterisation is not arbitrary) we 
may briefly note that Lyotard himself suggests that just such a reversal of 
phenomenology was already at work in Discourse, Figure. In the book itself he writes 
that “one can walk the same path as Merleau-Ponty, but in the opposite direction, our 
back toward him.”52 Reflecting back on Discourse, Figure in his 1987 book What to 
Paint?, Lyotard focuses on his critique of the way Merleau-Ponty attempted to 
reconcile the Freudian unconscious with his own ontology of the flesh (a critique 
which boils down to the same essential issues as the metaphysics of continuity 
discussed above). He then explains that his own strategy in Discourse, Figure was to 
                                                        
51 “The event cannot be situated elsewhere than in the vacant space opened up by desire. This 
vacancy of space is precisely the preferred site of the bestowal.” Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 
18. 
52 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, 54. 
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 “invert the movement of phenomenologisation of the unconscious: not ground the 
symptom in an ontology of the invisible of the visible, but dramatise the visual work – 
painting first and foremost – by identifying the search for an unpresentable event, as 
invisible as the primal scene can be.”53 
 
 
Apparition 
 
As I indicated at the outset, there has so far been little attempt in the existing secondary 
literature to account for the noticeable shifts in themes and terminology of Lyotard’s 
late writings in aesthetics.54 Yet there is indeed such a shift: in the very late nineteen-
eighties and early nineteen-nineties, Lyotard’s last discussions of aesthetics in 
predominantly Kantian terms coincide with the introduction of new terms which begin 
to dominate: allusive terms that are only briefly outlined, and which can appear gnomic 
unless illuminated by a broader context. This broader context, I am suggesting, is 
precisely phenomenology and Lyotard’s earlier critical engagements with it. I propose 
to call this Lyotard’s “Dark period” because of the themes of darkness, blindness, 
death, and dark affect (melancholy, despair, terror, anger, etc.) which characterise 
many of these late writings. His aesthetics in this period might be considered to return 
to a phenomenological perspective insofar as it is governed by a thematic of 
appearing. This is signalled by the term “apparition” as the leading, privileged term to 
describe the artwork. Lyotard distinguishes between the apparition and the 
appearance: the latter indicates what appears in ordinary perception, while the former 
indicates what is proper to art. In a characteristic passage, he now explains such 
propriety as follows: 
 
What is played out [in the artwork] is the mutation of sight into vision and 
appearance into apparition. Apparition is appearance stamped with the seal of its 
disappearance. Art puts death’s insignia on the sensible. It ravishes sensation                                                         
53 Lyotard, What to Paint?, 239. Italics mine. 
54 One reason for this lack of attention is probably that many of these writings have not been 
widely available until relatively recently. The main book from this period is Karel Appel, 
available in neither French or English (only German) before 2009. Many of the essays on art 
and artists from this period have also only become available recently with the other volumes of 
the Louven series, especially Miscellaneous Texts 2. Available for somewhat longer have been 
the essays on aesthetics – of which ‘Music, Mutic’ and ‘Anima Minima’ are especially notable 
in relation to our concerns here – in Postmodern Fables. 
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 from the night and impresses the seal of darkness upon it.55  
 
Along the same lines, Lyotard also makes a distinction between the visible – a term he 
applies to “ordinary” sight – and the visual, the apparitional qualities of visual art. 
These visual, apparitional qualities are explicitly associated in one essay from this 
period56 with what Merleau-Ponty calls, in ‘Eye and Mind,’ the “ghost-like” qualities 
of artworks: 
 
Light, lighting, shadows, reflections, color, all these objects of [the painter’s] 
quest are not altogether real objects; like ghosts, they have only visual existence. 
In fact they only exist at the threshold of profane vision: they are not ordinarily 
seen.57 
 
The visual is what is usually invisible in the visible, and the task of visual art is to 
make the invisible visible, to testify to the visual in the visible. 
 
In his “Dark period,” Lyotard further describes the artwork as the trace of a gesture in 
space-time-matter.58 This recalling of the Merleau-Pontian term “gesture” indicates 
that the meaning and authorship of the work are not to be ascribed to a creating subject 
alone: it is space-time-matter expressing itself through or with the artist, in a unity of 
sensing and sensed. The gesture is the bestowal of the event itself, an “absolutely 
emotive power,”59  while its trace is registered in the artwork that is presented to 
perception, as the visual in the visible. Lyotard invokes a paradox here (something he 
never shied away from) with respect to immanence and transcendence: the artwork 
differs from an object of “ordinary perception” insofar as it bears the trace of a beyond, 
of another space-time-matter than that of everyday, constituted experience, and in this 
it is transcendent. Yet this transcendence is nothing spiritual, supernatural, or even 
metaphysical – it is not the passage to another world – but merely a dimension of 
“ordinary” space-time-matter, and in this sense the artwork remains immanent to our 
everyday world. Lyotard writes:                                                         
55 Lyotard, ‘Anima Minima’ in Postmodern Fables, 246. 
56 Lyotard, ‘Because Colour is a Case of Dust’ in Miscellaneous Texts II, 661. 
57 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Eye and Mind’ in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, 128. 
58 See for example ‘Music, Mutic’ in Postmodern Fables, 217-18 and Karel Appel, 39-43. 
59 Lyotard, ‘Music, Mutic’ in Postmodern Fables, 218. 
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The work is an appearance in which apparition happens. From it emanates a 
space, a time, a palette, that are irreducible to their visual and cultural context. 
Another world? No, a world that remains sensible, made of aisthèta. […] Visual 
rather than simply visible.60 
 
This paradox may be further elaborated through Lyotard’s discussions of form and 
matter. 
 
For Lyotard, the artwork is nothing other than matter (not, for example, as an 
empiricist epistemology would conceive it, in terms of causally related, formed 
objects, but as it may be received and thought aesthetically). In painting, Lyotard tells 
us, colour is matter in this aesthetic sense. In his book Karel Appel: A Gesture of 
Colour, he writes that the task of painting is to 
 
let “colour itself” show through. In its truth, colour says nothing to form or forms. 
It is matter. But what is matter without form? That is hardly conceivable, and 
even imperceptible. In short, immaterial. Very good, says Appel, this is what one 
must render, that which the mind cannot conceive nor the eye perceive.61  
 
Thus the task of the painter is to render colour in a way which “transcends” our 
ordinary experience of it, which is the experience of matter subordinated to form. Yet 
this “transcendence” remains entirely immanent to the material world; it merely allows 
to surface a dimension which is difficult to perceive or to think in habitual terms. 
 
The invocation of gesture in Lyotard’s late aesthetics does not imply an embrace of a 
theory of expression reliant on a metaphysics of continuity. To the contrary, there is 
every indication that Lyotard’s earlier arguments against continuity and in favour of 
repression and misrecognition are still in force, despite the abandonment of the 
analytics of desire. Other key Freudian themes persist in these late works, especially 
the concepts of Nachträglichkeit (deferred action) and anamnesis. Their significance in 
Lyotard’s late aesthetics is especially evident in the latter term, where the phrase                                                         
60 Lyotard, ‘The Pictorial Event Today’ in Miscellaneous Texts I, 227-9. 61 Lyotard, Karel Appel, 71. 
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 ‘Anamnesis of the Visible,’ which had already been used to title an essay on Valerio 
Adami in the ‘eighties, is reused for an essay on Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger. 62 
Anamnesis, of course, with its Freudian inflection, means to recall what has been 
repressed. This invocation of anamnesis signals precisely the fact that the visual cannot 
be thought as something in continuity with the visible (however obliquely), but only as 
subject to the distortions repression imposes. Moreover, Lyotard’s work on 
Nachträglichkeit emphasises that what is recalled through anamnesis is not simply an 
experience which was already well-formed before it was repressed: what Freud calls 
“primary repression” suggests that with the occurrence of a traumatic event, the 
organism was unprepared to receive that event and so couldn’t constitute it as a 
coherent experience. It can therefore only be recalled as a traumatic trace, and pieced 
together after the fact, on the basis of its deferred action.63 The “anamnesis of the 
visible” suggests that the visual is precisely such an unpresentable in the visible, which 
can never be captured as well-formed presentation. A “true origin” of the visible will 
always elude us. The deformation of monstrous artworks testifies to this 
incommensurable order of sensation. 
 
Notably, many of the themes and terms that Lyotard uses in this late period are already 
present in Dufrenne’s writings, albeit with an ultimately different significance. For 
example, Dufrenne identifies the artwork (or more properly, for him, the aesthetic 
object) as an apparition: “What [art] produces is an apparition, thereby revealing the 
power of appearing.”64 And in particular, as we saw above, he announces the themes of 
death and night Lyotard will make central to his reflections in this period. Yet Lyotard 
deploys these terms in ways quite different to Dufrenne, to Merleau-Ponty, and indeed 
to other phenomenologists such as Henry who also employ metaphors of visible and 
invisible, day and night, life and death.  
 
The darkness into which we are continually plunged in the late works of Jean-François 
Lyotard, is an obscure avatar of the phenomenological reduction. We need to become 
blind to the visible, the world of vision as it is perceived according to the natural 
attitude, in order to become sensitive to the visual, that which shines through in the                                                         
62 Collected in Miscellaneous Texts II. 
63 For Lyotard’s discussion of these themes, see for example Heidegger and “the jews.” 
64 Dufrenne, In the Presence of the Sensuous, xi. 
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 apparition after the bracketing has taken place. Moreover, what “comes to light” 
through this passage of death and rebirth is something close to the transcendental 
revealed in “traditional” phenomenological reduction: what bestows the given. Lyotard 
writes that “[t]he point is always not to succumb to the temptation of the visible and to 
honour in it the obscure power of what makes it possible.”65 This “obscure power” 
sounds much like a transcendental condition of possibility. However, it is not an a 
priori structure which conditions the reception of the event; it is the singular event 
itself, a power of disruption which can only be indicated laterally or negatively: the 
mark of disappearance on appearance.  
 
Lyotard’s tropes of apparition and night in his late aesthetics in fact indicate a reversal 
of the phenomenological problematic: art does not show the birth of the world, its 
perceptual organisation or constitution, but its death, its deconstitution – the death of 
our habitual ways of perceiving and the opening to matter “prior” to form. Of the 
visual in works of art, Lyotard writes: “Merleau-Ponty said: nascent state. But it is 
equally their dying state.” 66  According to Dufrenne’s sympathetic elaboration of 
Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics, “Cézanne does not deconstruct, he pre-constructs. He does 
not shatter the fruit bowl, he shows us its genesis….it’s coming into the visible.”67 But 
Lyotard would have us consider that Cézanne does shatter the fruit bowl; that what he 
reveals is a loss of the visible, its death, rather than its birth. Lyotard now describes 
artworks as “monsters,” which he defines precisely as objects that show that they are 
not constituted.68 So, instead of plunging phenomena into night in order to witness how 
they are born, Lyotard sees artworks as returning from the night, shining in the light 
but bearing the sign of their death or deconstitution. For him, art does not give us 
knowledge of how habitual perception or the so-called natural world is organised or 
constituted, it shows us different and unexpected ways of perceiving by deconstituting 
such habitual perceptions, by disharmonizing the apparent natural accord between self 
and world. Lyotard does not believe that art’s vocation is to capture an origin, a 
primordial nature, and he is sceptical of any attempt to view things this way because it 
is a reconciliation fantasy, because it involves the contradiction of bringing darkness to 
                                                        
65 Lyotard, Sam Francis, §6 (unpaginated). 
66 Lyotard, ‘The Pictorial Event Today’ in Miscellaneous Texts I, 231. 
67 Dufrenne, ‘Eye and Mind’ in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, 260. 
68 Lyotard, ‘The Pictorial Event Today’ in Miscellaneous Texts I, 231. 
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 light, and because it unduly limits the range of arts we can consider legitimate and their 
critical, political power. Instead of the artist’s plunge into blindness returning us to 
nature, Lyotard sees it as a “second denaturation,” a deconstruction of the visible 
which would bring new invisibles to light rather than reveal a natural order of the 
visible in its primordial state. Art does not show the genesis of “good forms,” the 
emergence of order, but the invention of monstrous “bad forms,” the irruption of 
disorder.  
 
The “lesson of darkness” I have used as the title for this article is taken from Lyotard’s 
book Sam Francis: Lesson of Darkness: ‘like the paintings of a blind man.’ The term 
itself (leçons de ténèbres) refers originally to a form of baroque music dedicated to the 
commemoration of the period between the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. 
Significantly, Lyotard also uses the figure of Lazarus to characterise artworks: they are 
something come back from the dead.69 The lesson of darkness the artist gives us is 
testimony to the visual in the visible, a lesson won at the cost of a self-imposed 
blindness to the visible world, a death of sensibility. Yet the artwork is not simply the 
death of the visible, but its resurrection: it returns something to the light. We cannot 
access perception at the point of its birth; we have always already lived perception, and 
we must plunge into its death and then resurrect it in order to see something other than 
our habitual constitution or organisation of experience. This is because, according to 
Lyotard, we cannot think or perceive the event in and of itself; it is the unpresentable 
something that always eludes presentation, yet makes presentation possible. The event 
can only be apprehended through presentation, but laterally or negatively, as that 
which in appearance does not fully or clearly appear. Here we see the persistence of 
the theme of difference in the visual field, or the invisible in the visible. In Lyotard’s 
last writings these invisibles are indicated by the “mark of disappearance” in the 
apparition. Lyotard’s “lesson of darkness” is that art testifies to the death of the world 
and its resurrection, rather than to its birth.  
 
In a sense Lyotard’s aesthetics unfolds phenomenology’s own movement beyond itself, 
to seek the conditions of appearance which do not themselves appear. Yet Lyotard 
differs significantly from the phenomenologists insofar as he sees phenomenology as                                                         
69 See in particular the essay ‘Fait Pictural [Necessity of Lazarus]’ in Miscellaneous Texts II. 
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 wedded to epistemological and metaphysical commitments: it seeks knowledge, 
ultimately of Being itself. Lyotard’s philosophy is animated by a doubt about the 
possibility of such knowledge, a doubt which manifests in his refusal of the thesis of 
continuity between Being and meaning which Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty entertain, 
in favour of the rupture of the event. For Lyotard, the investigation into the conditions 
of possibility of appearance in the aesthetic field is no longer the search for a 
knowledge of the organisation or constitution of the good forms of ordinary 
experience. Rather, it is the search for what bestows the event, which for Lyotard is the 
obscure secret of art’s power.      
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